Ideology

Replacing the Referees

Most democratic declines are now led from within. What slows them is a referee who can still say no.

Khawaja H. Ahmed10 min read

In July, Hungary's new majority amended the constitution to end the terms of the president and four constitutional judges. It had won two-thirds of parliament in the election that ended Viktor Orbán's 16 years in power. It used that majority against officials chosen under Orbán. Its defenders call this repair. Its critics call it Orbán's method in better hands. Both describe the act on which democracies now turn: a government replacing the institutions able to refuse it. Creed does not explain who commits that act. Governments of the left and the right have both committed it, in Mexico as in El Salvador, and in the half century to 2019 they led about as many democratic declines. Whether a democracy survives depends less on who erodes it than on whether its courts can still refuse. An institution can refuse a government only as long as that government cannot replace it. Replacing one is repair rather than capture only when the new majority does not control how it is done.

Authoritarianism here names a way of using power, not a creed. It is the concentration of power by those who already hold it, through disabling the courts, elections, press, civic groups, or rights that could check or remove them, whatever program it serves. Steven Levitsky and Daniel Ziblatt describe elected autocrats who first capture the referees: the courts, election commissions, and tax agencies that could rule against them. David Landau named the legal route abusive constitutionalism, "the use of mechanisms of constitutional change to erode the democratic order." Kim Lane Scheppele calls the pattern autocratic legalism. These accounts describe how referees are captured. This essay asks a narrower question, whether they can be replaced. A court that can still say no helps keep the next election meaningful, unlike a court that can be refilled by the government it ruled against.

The act is starkest in El Salvador. In February 2020, after Nayib Bukele brought soldiers into the Legislative Assembly, the Supreme Court's Constitutional Chamber ordered him not to misuse the armed forces, and the government said it would comply. A year later his party won 56 of the Assembly's 84 seats. On May 1, 2021, the day the new Assembly first sat, its deputies removed the chamber's five judges. That night the chamber declared the removal unconstitutional, calling it abusive constitutionalism. The ruling changed nothing. In September the new judges cleared the way for Bukele's reelection, reversing the court's earlier reading that the constitution barred it. The refusal lasted only until the court could be replaced, by deputies who controlled every step.

Mexico supplies the matching case from the left. Andrés Manuel López Obrador's party, Morena, won power in 2018. In September 2024, in his last weeks in office, his coalition passed a reform putting every federal judge to a popular vote. Within weeks, under his successor, Claudia Sheinbaum, the coalition amended the constitution to bar any court from reviewing amendments. In November 2024 the Supreme Court fell one vote short of striking down part of the reform. By then its power to refuse the next amendment was gone. In December the coalition abolished seven autonomous regulators, among them the transparency watchdog. In June 2025 about 13% of voters elected roughly half the federal judiciary, and most of the new Supreme Court's justices were or had been Morena members. V-Dem, a Gothenburg institute that surveys country experts yearly, has rated Mexico an electoral autocracy since 2024.

Venezuela took the same road earlier. In 2004 Hugo Chávez's supporters in the National Assembly enlarged the Supreme Court from 20 justices to 32, let a simple majority appoint and remove them, and filled the new seats with the government's allies.

The United States is the live test. In his second term Donald Trump has federalized state National Guard units and sent them into cities in states whose governors objected. He has fired independent commissioners Congress had protected from removal and withheld money Congress had appropriated. His administration froze more than $2 billion in research grants to Harvard.

The courts have not been replaced, and they have often refused. A district judge found the Harvard freeze was retaliation for protected speech. In December 2025 the Supreme Court refused to let the president deploy the Guard in Illinois. In February 2026 the court, three of whose justices he appointed, ruled six to three against his tariffs on most of the world. The emergency law he had used to impose them without a congressional vote, it found, gave him no such power. In June 2026 the same court let him fire Federal Trade Commission members at will, overturning a 1935 precedent. Whether such refusals hold depends on whether the bench and the elections that renew everything else stay beyond the reach of the government they constrain.

Where the refusers cannot be replaced, refusal holds. In Slovakia, Robert Fico returned to power in 2023 at the head of what V-Dem calls "a nationalist-populist coalition." Within months his government abolished the special prosecutor's office for high-level corruption and rewrote the criminal code to cut penalties and shorten limitation periods. It also passed a law requiring nongovernmental organizations to publish their donors.

The Constitutional Court let the prosecutor's office go but struck down parts of the criminal code changes and, on December 17, 2025, the donor law. Slovakia's constitutional judges serve single 12-year terms. Most of the sitting bench took office in 2019, chosen from candidates elected by a parliament whose majority Fico's own party then led. His coalition lacks the three-fifths majority needed to change the constitution on its own.

Established democracies narrow freedoms too, though rarely by replacing referees. In Britain, a 2023 law made it a crime to attach oneself to people, objects, or land in ways that seriously disrupt others. The government proscribed Palestine Action under terrorism law in 2025, citing criminal damage at a military air base. In February 2026 the High Court found the ban disproportionate; in June the Court of Appeal reversed that ruling, and the Supreme Court hears a final appeal in November. V-Dem finds Britain's decline since 2020 "largely driven by a substantial decline in freedom of expression and the media." Britain shows a court refusing, a government appealing, and a higher court deciding, through a process neither side controls. That is narrowing, which limits what citizens may do and which a democracy can survive. Replacement removes who may say no.

The cases fit a wider record. Anna Lührmann and Staffan Lindberg found that of 47 declines in democracies from 1994 to 2017, 33 were led by incumbents who came to power legally and wore the system down gradually. Of the 28 democracies V-Dem listed as declining at the end of 2025, this essay's own count finds an elected government leading 23. Creed does not sort them. From 1970 to 2019 about as many declines in democracies came under the illiberal left as under the illiberal right, both meaning anti-pluralist parties scored by their economic positions. Of those that ended, about one in five avoided breakdown under either.

Courts help sort the declines. Vanessa Boese and colleagues at V-Dem found that after erosion starts, judicial constraints predict whether a democracy survives. The odds are poor once decline begins. Of 96 episodes from 1900 to 2019, only 19 avoided breakdown. Since the mid-1990s democracy has broken down in most such episodes, but V-Dem's researchers find it was restored within a few years in about half of those breakdowns. In most, the ballot box removed the governments that did the damage.

Hungary is where the standard is hardest to apply, because the regime the new majority inherited was built by the same act. Orbán's Fidesz party won two-thirds of parliament in 2010, enough to change the constitution alone. It enlarged the Constitutional Court from 11 judges to 15, filled the seats without the opposition's agreement, and stripped the court of review over budget and tax laws. In 2011 it passed a new constitution. It lowered judges' retirement age from 70 to 62, forcing out senior judges, a change the EU Court of Justice ruled unjustified age discrimination in 2012. In 2018 pro-government owners handed 476 media outlets to a single foundation, and the government exempted the merger from competition review. By then V-Dem rated Hungary an electoral autocracy. In April 2026 voters removed Orbán anyway, giving the Tisza party 141 of 199 seats. The courts and the presidency Tisza inherited had been filled by the government voters had just rejected.

Nóra Chronowski, a constitutional scholar the new majority later elected to the court, calls removing the president a justified, "exceptional and temporary" change. Scheppele put the dilemma plainly: the new prime minister "will have to break the law to make the law," and "there have to be checks on that process." Much of the amendment widens those checks, giving judges a say over who leads the courts. But the president sought the Venice Commission's opinion and said the government passed the amendment without agreeing to wait for it. The amendment also bars from parliament anyone who has served three terms, which catches most of the opposition's sitting members. In September, by 137 votes to six, the new majority filled five seats on the court with its own nominees, including the four the amendment emptied. Replacement that waits for no outside judge, rewrites who may run, and fills the court with its own choices is not repair.

The strongest objection is that much of what this essay calls authoritarianism is democracy at work. Defending Mexico's judicial reform, Sheinbaum asked how letting the people choose their judges could be authoritarian. On this view, courts, independent broadcasters, and foreign-funded civic groups are unelected obstacles to the majority, and removing them returns power to its owner. The objection is right that a court can block a majority and that an election is the strongest claim any government holds. It fails on what a majority is. A majority is a coalition of the moment, and the limits it dismantles are the ones that protect its members when they become a minority and allow the next majority to form at all. The premise here is that every will is bound, the people's included, and no claimant is entitled to speak for the people without limit. Electing judges may be defensible. Barring every court from reviewing amendments makes the majority the only judge of its own limits.

A second objection comes from the right. Its holders argue that power now concentrates in courts, prosecutors, and officials no voter can remove, the managerial elite in Michael Lind's phrase. To them, the refusals this essay praises are that power at work. In December 2024 Romania's Constitutional Court annulled the first round of a presidential election. In March 2025 it upheld a ban on the candidate who had won it. The objection is right that a court can decide who may stand, and courts face the same test as governments. Romania's court gave its reasons, but it voided the vote on its own authority, without ruling on the complaints before it. A court that rules on cases others bring, whose verdicts can be appealed, whose reasons are published, and whose members can be replaced only by a process its beneficiaries do not control is a check. The same test reaches prosecutors and officials. One that answers to nothing is not a check, whichever side it favors.

Long, staggered terms keep any one majority from refilling a court at once. Appointing bodies that a ruling's beneficiaries do not control keep the referee from being chosen by a player. Rules that delay a change until after the next election, or make a government wait for outside review, slow the replacing enough for voters to judge it. None stops a determined supermajority. But each makes it pay a visible price. The harder test falls on new majorities that inherit captured institutions, as Hungary's has. They cannot leave the referees their predecessors chose in place and call it restraint, and they cannot replace them on their own terms and call it repair. They can replace them through a process they do not control and wait for its verdict. Before 2010 a majority could choose constitutional judges only with the opposition. Restoring that rule first would have met this standard.

Democracies rarely end now on the day the tanks arrive. Hungary's voters ended 16 years of a government built to outlast them. El Salvador's judges refused a president and were gone 15 months later. The difference was not the creed of either government. It was whether the institutions able to refuse could be replaced by the government they refused. A democracy whose answer is still no maintains the means to recover.


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